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Using  a  sample  of  US  acquisitions  in 
Africa over the last 2 decades, we assess 
the  long  term  performance  of 
international  acquisitions  in  Africa,  and 
the  impact  of  firm  and  country  level 
governance  characteristics  on  reported 
performance. We show that acquirers do 
not  benefit  from  these  transactions.  We 
also  find  that  acquisitions  made  in 
countries  characterized  by  strong  and 
impartial  legal  systems  lead  to  higher 
returns, while those observed in unstable 
economies  generate  lower  returns. 
Interestingly, the level of corruption does 
not affect reported performance. Previous 
experience  in  Africa  and  the  acquirer’s 
board  size  seem  to  be  significant 
determinants of reported performance as 
well. Our results contrasts with the view 
that  a  strong  legal  framework  reduces 
acquirers’  ability  to  make  large  returns 
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1.  Introduction 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) remain a highly popular form of corporate reorganization and 
growth, globally and in Africa. Over the last two decades, there has been a dramatic rise in the 
number of acquisitions of African businesses by foreign companies. For instance, during the 
period  2003-2008,  the  number  of  completed  M&A  transactions  targeting  African  firms  and 
involving  non-African  acquirers  more  than  doubled  while  the  value  of  those  transactions 
increased  seven  fold  (Figure  1).  According  to  Thomson  One
2, the most active non regional 
acquirers in Africa over the period 1982-2010 were the United Kingdom, the United States and 
Canada, both in terms of transaction value and number of deals. 
 
M&A  transactions  are  commonly  expected  to  increase  firm  value  through  geographical 
diversification, synergies, economies of scale, or diversification of cash flow streams. Yet, M&A 
may also destroy value if they are motivated by managerial empire building attitude, commonly 
referred  to,  as  managerial  hubris  (Roll,  1986).  Economic  theory  suggests  that  effective 
governance mechanisms at the firm level might help curb managerial  opportunistic behavior, 
reducing  the  likelihood  that  firms  undertake  unprofitable  acquisitions.  Moreover,  evidence 
suggests that acquirers are more likely to report successful M&A transactions when  targeted 
countries  maintain  a  legal  framework  that  promotes  institutional  stability,  fairness  and 
accountability. The legal environment encompasses investor protection, transparency and overall 
quality of accounting standards. Rossi and Volpin (2004), and Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) 
show that these factors are significant determinants of M&A. This view contrasts with the 
argument that a strong legal framework reduces M&A opportunities where acquirers could make 
large returns by turning around poorly governed firms.  
 
The M&A literature remains heavily focused on US markets and to a lesser extent on UK 
markets. Very few studies looked at the profitability of M&A in Africa which is largely a 
function of the limited availability of reliable data on those t ransactions. Collectively, research 
on the M&A market in Africa has sought to explain the determinants of FDIs flows (Kamaly, 
2007) or to study the short term market reaction to M&A announcements in South Africa, with 
the notable exception of Smit and Ward (2007) and Wimberely and Negash (2004) who explored 
the long term stock and operating performance of south African deals, respectively.  
 
This paper addresses this gap in the literature by studying the long term stock performance of 
M&A targeting African firms and the determinants of the observed returns. To the best of our 
knowledge, we provide the first study of the effect of internal governance (at the firm level) and 
external governance (at the country level) characteristics on the performance of acqui rers who 
targeted African firms. To do so, we focus on US acquisitions in Africa for two main reasons: a) 
US acquirers are the second most active in Africa both in terms of transactions number and 
value, and b) Detailed data on the governance and ownership  structure of US publicly traded 
companies is available in the proxy statements published annually by those companies. This 
makes the study of the governance structure at acquirers’ level possible.  
 
Overall, the paper answers the following questions: (1) What are the important trends in the 
M&A market between the US and Africa? (2) Are shareholders of US acquirers benefiting from 
                                                 
2 Formerly SDC platinum. 6 
 
their  acquisitions  in  Africa  in  the  long  run,  and  what  affects  reported  returns?  (3)  What 
governance  reforms  are  needed  in  order  to  enhance  Africa’s  attractiveness  for  international 
investors? Studying the effect of governance on the performance of international acquisitions in 
Africa is  of particular interest  for regulatory purposes.  Indeed, empirical  evidence that links 
weak governance to higher returns for acquirers will support the argument that international 
acquirers  are  able  to  extract  high  returns  thanks  to  the  weak  governance  that  some  African 
countries suffer from. This will highlight the need to offer more protection to local businesses 
while not hindering FDI. Conversely, a positive relation between governance and returns will 
illustrate  the  need  to  strengthen  foreign  investors’  protection  in  order  to  attract  more  FDI. 
Despite several reforms aimed at promoting sound corporate governance on the continent such as 
the “King report on Corporate Governance in South Africa”, Africa still has a reputation of 
maintaining poor economic and political governance structures. This may have undermined its 
attractiveness  as  a  destination  for  direct  acquisitions.  High  levels  of  corruption  reported  in 
several African countries exacerbate this reputation problem.  
 
Our results suggest that US acquirers do not benefit from their African acquisitions and report 
negative returns following these transactions.  This  finding supports  the accepted idea in  the 
literature  that  M&A  are  not  value  creating  for  acquirers,  and  shows  that  Africa  is  not  an 
exception. The empirical findings drawn from the multivariate analysis suggest that acquisitions 
of South African targets or in countries with strong and impartial legal systems lead to higher 
performance while those observed in countries with high economic instability generate lower 
returns.  Surprisingly,  the  level  of  corruption  does  not  affect  observed  returns.  Additionally, 
acquirers with previous experience in Africa and those with small board size are more likely to 
outperform. These results suggest that African countries should target enhanced macroeconomic 
stability and strengthen foreign investor’s protection in order to attract more FDI. While our 
results should be interpreted with caution given the small size of our sample, we believe they still 
provide new insights about the level and determinants of M&A performance in Africa. 
 
The  remainder  of  the  text  is  structured  as  follows.  Section  2  reviews  the  literature  on  the 
performance of M&A globally and in Africa. Section 3 describes our dataset while Section 4 
provides stylized facts about the market for M&A between the US and Africa. Section 5 and 6 
report  our  results  describing  the  performance  of  US  acquisitions  and  the  determinants  of 
observed  returns,  respectively.  Section  7  summarizes  our  robustness  checks  while  section  8 
concludes the paper.  
 
2.  Related literature 
The literature on M&A has been piling up over the last two decades and yielded useful insights 
about the profitability of these transactions, and how their returns are distributed between the 
acquiring and targeted companies. Overall, three approaches are used in the literature to assess 
whether M&A create value for shareholders of acquiring and targeted firms namely i) abnormal 
returns  drawn  from  event  studies  over  the  period  surrounding  the  announcement  of  the 
transaction, ii) change in profitability measured by comparing pre and post acquisitions values of 
accounting ratios (e.g. the return on equity, growth rate or return on assets) and iii) Long-run 
stock returns following the transaction measured by the cumulative average abnormal returns 
(CAAR), the buy and hold returns or the calendar time approach. Collectively the empirical 
evidence  suggests  that  target  shareholders  unambiguously  earn  positive  returns  from  such 7 
 
transactions,  while  there  is  no  consensus  about  the  value  enhancing  effect  of  M&A  for 
shareholders of acquiring firms.  This paper fits within the third approach. The remainder of this 
section discusses the main empirical findings in relation with our research focus. 
 
Despite M&A popularity, the question of long term post acquisition profitability to acquiring 
firms remains an important, but largely unresolved empirical issue. Using data from the US 
market, Rau and Vermaelen (1998) report significant CAAR ranging between -4% for mergers, 
to 9% for tender offers over the 3 years following M&A announcement, while Loughran and 
Vijh (1997) empirical findings suggest that bidders experience buy and hold returns ranging 
from -14.2% for mergers, to 61.3% for tender offers over the 5 years following the acquisition. 
Returns following mergers are statically significant but only marginally significant following 
tender offers.  Gregory (1997) finds similar results for the UK market with significant CAAR 
ranging between -18% and 11.82% over the 2 years following the acquisitions. However, his 
sample does not separate mergers from tender offers. Agrawal and Jaffee (2000) conclude that, at 
best, shareholders of acquiring firms are not worse off in tender offers but often experience 
negative returns in mergers. Yet, these returns are not necessarily statistically different from 
zero. Furthermore, acquirers that pay cash seem to experience higher returns than those who pay 
with stocks.  
 
The research on the profitability of African acquisitions mainly focuses on the short term market 
reaction to M&A announcements. The evidence reported for the South African market supports 
the  general  conclusion  that  targets  earn  positive  returns  while  acquirers  earn  negative  or 
statistically  non-significant  positive  returns  over  the  period  surrounding  the  announcement 
(Mushidzhi and Ward, 2004; Smit and Ward, 2007). To the best of our knowledge, Wimberley 
and Negash (2004) provide the only study that looks at the long term stock performance of M&A 
undertaken by South African industrial companies. The study covers the period 1989-1998 and 
shows a negative and significant CAAR of -10.5% over the 3 years following the acquisition, 
which  is  consistent  with  Agrawal  et  al.  (1992)  findings  (-12.4%)  and  exceed  the  abnormal 
returns  reported  in  Rau  and  Vermaelen  (1998)  for  the  US  market  (-4.9%).  Interestingly, 
Wimberley and Negash (2004) report positive CAAR after the first  year suggesting that the 
market might be overoptimistic at the announcement but later adjusts stock prices downwards. 
Using a sample of 27 South African M&A, over the period 2000-2002, Smit and Ward (2007) 
report positive but not statistically significant abnormal cash flow returns on assets, over the 2 
years  following  the  transactions.  No  difference  in  performance  was  observed  between  cash-
funded and share-funded transactions. On the medium term, De Jaeger (2008) report statistically 
negative returns for a sample of 12 acquiring companies involved in cross-border M&A into sub-
Saharan Africa. The negative performance reported in De Jaeger (2008) could also be driven by 
the higher cost of cross-border transactions. According to Rossi and Volpin (2004), acquiring firms 
pay on average an additional 3% in premium for cross-border transactions.   
 
Based on the above review, we develop the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: shareholders of US companies involved  in acquisitions of African targets  are 
expected, at best, not lose money from these transactions.  
 
Hypothesis 2: shareholders of US companies involved in cash-funded acquisitions of African 
companies should benefit from higher returns.  8 
 
3.  Data 
The initial dataset includes all M&A involving African targets between January 1970 and March 
2010 available from Thomson One.
3 This leads to a total of 9,643 observations, out which 457 
deals correspond to transactions where the acquirer is a US company. We subseque ntly applied 
the following filters:  transactions  must be “completed”, and acquiring firms  must be a non-
financial institution. Given the unique nature of financial institutions, we decided to focus only 
on transactions related to the real sector that are not focusing on value creation through financial 
engineering.  This led to a sub-sample of 255 transactions completed by US non-financial firms. 
In order to spot potential errors in Thomson One, we hand-checked the information reported for 
each transaction by screening the acquirers’ annual and quarterly reports as well as news releases 
published around the date of the acquisition. This screening resulted in the elimination of 15 
additional observations. Our usable sample comprises 240 M&A transactions, out of which 131 
involve South African targets. 
 
In order to study the determinants of acquirers’ performance we collected stock prices adjusted 
for dividends and splits from Datastream for publicly traded US acquirers. Information about the 
deal  characteristics  and  acquirers’  book  to  market  ratio  were  collected  from  Thomson  One. 
Governance and capital structure variables for acquiring companies were hand collected from 
proxy statements and annual reports. Measures of the target institutional environment are from 
Political Risk Services' International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). We use  returns on the size, 
industry and book to market portfolios available on the website of Kenneth French to implement 
our calendar time approach. Given the large number of missing observations for certain variables 
provided  by  Thomson  One,  we  checked  manually  annual  and  quarterly  reports,  newswires, 
specialized magazines and newspapers articles, for information describing the deal, the acquirer 
and the target to increase our sample size. Our final sample includes 64 transactions conducted in 
Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Egypt, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, and South 
Africa; out of which 36 correspond to South African targets.  
 
4.  Stylized facts about US acquisitions in Africa 
This section discusses stylized facts drawn from the 240 transactions completed by US acquirers 
in  Africa. Companies  involved in  African M&A are quite  advanced in their life cycle. The 
average  age  for  acquirers  is  58  years  compared  to  23  years  for  targets.  Over  two  third  of 
acquirers  are  publicly  traded.  Very  few  transactions  are  triggered  by  privatizations  (8%)  or 
mergers  initiatives  (6%);  and  35%  of  them  involve  companies  that  already  had  business 
relationships.  Cash seems to be the common way of paying for African acquisitions, with only 
14%  of  the  transactions  paid  with  stocks  and  9%  paid  with  a  mix  of  instruments.  57%  of 
observed  M&A  lead  to  sector  diversification  and  80%  to  change  in  control  (average  shares 
acquired is 75.47%). 
 
Table 1 lists the five most attractive target countries for US firms while Figure 2 provides a 
distribution of targeted sectors. Not surprisingly, South Africa is the most attractive country for 
US companies, followed by North Africa (Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia). These countries have 
stable economies, advanced financial systems and business environments that are friendly for 
                                                 
3 Even though the data request starts in 1970, the first transaction in the sample starts in March 1982 9 
 
foreign  investors.  All  deals  observed  in  Angola  are  related  to  the  oil  sector  while  those  in 
Zimbabwe were observed for the consumer goods sector. This illustrates the heterogeneity of the 
transactions included in our sample. Interestingly the manufacturing sector attracted the highest 
number of acquisitions (38%) followed by mining (25%) and services (17%). To a certain extent, 
this finding contrasts with the traditional belief that foreign companies are mainly interested in 
taking control of African resources.    
 
Figure 3 draws a time distribution of US acquisitions in Africa over the period 1982-2010. The 
graph shows a limited number of transactions over the period 1982-1989 mainly due to the Anti-
Apartheid Act that was passed in 1986 and prohibited US firms from investing or doing business 
in South Africa. The lifting of US sanctions in July 1991 helped catalyze some acquisitions in 
Africa but the effect remained limited due to the criticism over the US administration’s decision 
and tension following the indictment of the Armaments Corporation of South Africa (Armscor) 
by a US court. The number of US acquisitions peeked over the period 1996-2000 following the 
return of several US companies to South Africa and the reforms undertaken elsewhere on the 
continent to improve the business environment. As a matter of fact, 7% of South African targets 
in our sample used to be local subsidiaries of the US acquirers before the commercial sanctions. 
The number of acquisitions dropped twofold during the period 2007-2010, probably as a result of 
the financial crisis.  
 
The deal value was available for 118 transactions and shows relatively small transaction sizes 
with average and medium values standing at USD 62 million and US 13.5 million, respectively. 
The largest deal realized by a US non-financial firm over our sample period was the acquisition 
of CMS' ownership interests in Equatorial Guinea by Marathon Oil for approximately USD 1 
billion in 2002.  
 
5.  Long term performance of US acquisitions in Africa    
We  measure  acquirers’  long  term  performance  by  the  buy  and  hold  returns  (BHR)  on  an 
unadjusted and adjusted base by subtracting from the corresponding BHR, the return on the 
S&P500 index. Table 2 summarizes the 1-year BHR and the 1 year- market adjusted BHAR for 
our sample of US publicly traded acquirers. Results suggest that US acquirers report on average 
positive returns of 16.3% one year after the transaction. This return outperforms the market, 
leading to an adjusted 1-year BHR of 11.6%. Findings in Panel B show that South African 
acquisitions generate higher gross returns for US acquirers but not always when adjusted for the 
market  performance.  Yet,  the  difference  between  both  groups  is  statistically  not  significant. 
Results  in  Panel  C  are  consistent  with  previous  conclusions  in  the  literature  related  to  the 
superior  performance  of  cash-funded  transactions.  Again,  the  difference  is  not  statistically 
significant  which  does  not  support  our  second  hypothesis  H2.  Our  conclusions  remain 
unchanged when we consider the 2-year buy and hold returns. In unreported results we also 
compare the financial returns registered by acquirers before and after the financial crisis. The 
mean 1-year BHR  for transactions observed prior to the financial crisis is 20.73%  while the 
same return for transactions observed post crisis is -25.9%. Interestingly, the t-test value shows 





Results reported in Table 2 correspond to simple descriptive statistics which might not be robust 
and particularly sensitive to the selected market benchmark. In order to conduct a more robust 
assessment the performance of US acquisitions, we use a calendar–time approach based on the 
Fama-French three factor model as in Mitchell and Stafford (2000). For each calendar month of 
our sample period, we form a portfolio using the sample of all acquirers which undertook a 
M&A transaction over the last three years. Excess returns are then regressed on the Fama-French 
3-factor model to control for size, market movement and book to market.
4 
 
Rpt – Rft = α + βm(Rmt- Rft) + βsSMBt + βhHMLt + εt,                              (1) 
 
Where Rpt is the portfolio return of active acquirers in month t, Rft is the risk-free interest rate, 
Rmt is the market return, SMBt and HMLt are the difference in returns between a portfolio of 
small companies (high book-to market), and large companies (low book-to-market), respectively. 
The intercept, α, captures abnormal returns that are experienced by acquirers.   
 
Table 3 summarizes results computed with the three-factor model. They show a negative and 
significant  intercept  α,  thus  contradicting  our  conclusions  from  the  univariate  analysis.  This 
result supports our first hypothesis H1 and is consistent with Wimberley and Negash (2004) 
conclusion for South African targets and De Jaeger (2008) for sub-Saharan African targets. It 
also supports the general idea that acquirers do not benefit from their acquisitions and show that 
Africa is not an exception. 
 (Table 3) 
 
6.  Determinants of the post-acquisition performance of US M&A in Africa 
 
6.1 . Model 
Despite the large body of literature that studied M&A profitability, key factors for success or 
failure remain poorly understood. This section provides potential explanations of the observed 
performance registered by US acquirers following their acquisitions in Africa. Our measure of 
acquirers’  long  term  performance  is  the  1-year  BHR.
5  The  model controls for three set of 
arguments namely deal characteristics, acquirer’s governance structure and target institutional 
environment.  
 
6.1.1. Deal characteristics 
 
Diversification  effect:  Berger  and  Ofek  (1995)  and  Maquieira  et  al.  (1998)  show  that 
diversification destroys value for the bidder while focusing transactions tend to produce positive 
returns. Doukas and Land (2003) find similar results in the case of FDI. This is probably due to 
the fact that focusing deals are more likely to produce synergies and savings to the bidder. We 
include a dummy variable (Focus) that equals one if the target and the bidder have identical 4-
digit SIC codes, zero otherwise and expect this variable to have a positive coefficient. 
 
                                                 
4 Our results remain unchanged when we include the momentum factor. 
5 We use the 1-year BHR in order to maximize our sample size. 11 
 
Glamour deals: Rau and Vermaelen (1998) conclude that low book to market “glamour” bidders 
underperform value bidders (companies with high book-to-market firms) on the long run which 
is consistent with the hubris hypothesis. The market and management might be extrapolating the 
bidder's  past  performance  (as  reflected  in  the  book-to-market  ratio),  causing  investors  and 
management  to  be  overly  optimistic  about  the  outcome  of  the  acquisition.  Wimberley  and 
Negash (2004) findings support this conclusion for the South African market. We control for this 
argument by including the book to market ratio (BTM) and expect this variable to have a positive 
coefficient. 
 
Method of payment: According to the information asymmetry theory developed by Myers and 
Majluf (1984), using stocks to pay for acquisitions could signal that the stock of the acquiring 
firm is overvalued which leads the stock price to adjust downwards. Asquith et al. (1983), Dong 
et al. (2006), Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) and more recently Kyriazis (2008) find that cash-
based deals outperform stock based deals. Conversely, Wimberley and Negash (2004) findings 
for South African acquirers do not support this conclusion. We use a dummy variable equals to 1 
if the transaction is paid cash (Cash) and expect this variable to have a positive coefficient
6.  
 
Change in control: taking controlling stakes in the target firm allows the bidder to exercise 
greater control on operations. We include a dummy variable indicating whether the transaction 
leads to a change in control (Control) as a control variable and expect it to have a positive 
coefficient.  
 
Culture  fit:  According  to  Stahl  and  Voight  (2008),  cultural
  differences  can  represent  major 
obstacles to successful acquisitions. Their results suggest a significant negative relation between 
culture differences and long term performance of acquisitions. Acquirers who have previous 
business  experience  in  Africa  should  be  more  comfortable  in  dealing  with  local  business 
conditions. We control for the cultural fit between the target and the acquiring firm by including 
a dummy variable that equals to one if the acquirer has previous business experience in Africa 
(Experience). We expect this variable to have a positive coefficient.  
 
South African targets: South Africa is one of the most advanced and dynamic economies on the 
continent and offers a friendly business environment for acquirers. This should foster successful 
acquisitions. The culture barrier between the US and South Africa is also less important than 
other regions of the continent, at least language wise. However, given the high competiveness in 
the South African market, there might be less room to buy attractive targets at cheap prices. We 
control for the South African effect by including a dummy equals to one if the target home 
country is South Africa (South Africa) and we do not offer any expectations on the sign of this 
variable.  
 
6.1.2. Acquirer’s governance structure 
 
Strong governance at the acquirer level should reduce the probability of undertaking M&A that 
are not value creating. We use three variables to control for the governance structure of the 
                                                 
6 Given that most of our transactions correspond to tender offers, we were not able to control for the type of 
acquisitions. Based on the evidence reported in the literature, tender offers are expected to lead to higher returns 
than mergers. The same argument applies for the acquisition of private targets.  12 
 
acquiring company, namely the percentage of shares held by outside block holders (Block), the 
percentage of board members that are independent (IND board) and the size of the board of 
directors (BOD size).  Outside block holders will bear a larger cost of unsuccessful acquisitions 
than  small  shareholders  which  provide  them  with  the  financial  incentive  to  exercise  better 
monitoring. They also have the capacity to exercise a stronger monitoring. Large boards are also 
expected to exercise more control over the firm’s management as long as the size does not hinder 
communication  between  board  members.  Finally,  Fama  and  Jensen  (1983)  emphasize  the 
importance  of  outside  directors  in  monitoring  the  firm’s  management.  Outside  directors  are 
expected to exercise better monitoring because they do not depend on existing management and 
are interested in building a reputation in the market to receive more directorship nominations. 
Accordingly, the three variables are expected to have positive coefficients.  
 
6.1.3. Target institutional environment 
 
Rossi and Volpin (2004) findings suggest that acquirers involved in cross-border transactions 
often come from countries with stronger investor protection than targets, and conclude that cross 
border  M&A  could  serve  as  channels  to  achieve  worldwide  convergence  in  governance 
standards. Alba et al. (2009) argue that acquisition of targets in countries characterized by weak 
governance  environment  offers  attractive  opportunities  to  achieve  higher  returns  by 
strengthening the governance structure of the target. Their evidence suggests that improvements 
in corporate governance in the US reduced the attractiveness of US firms for Japanese FDI in the 
form of M&A. This result could also reflect the larger premium paid for targets in countries with 
strong shareholders protection reported in Rossi and Volpin (2004).  Strong governance at the 
target country level could also be value enhancing for acquirers if it helps protect their rights. We 
control for the target institutional environment by using the following variables i) Law and Order 
which measures the strength, impartiality and respect of the law in the country (higher values 
imply a better legal system), ii) The economic risk rating (ERR) which measures the economic 
stability in the country. This rating uses information about the country’s foreign debt as a % of 
GDP,  current  account  as  a  %  of  imports  and  exports,  exchange  rate  stability  and  country’s 
liquidity as months of imports cover and iii) Corruption which measures the extent of financial 
corruption,  excessive  patronage,  'favor-for-favors',  and  suspicious  ties  between  politics  and 
business (higher values imply a more corrupted system). The ERR variable is expected to have a 
negative  coefficient.  Strong  legal  systems  (weak  corruption  level)  should  help  enforce 
agreements  and  make  M&A  more  profitable.  Conversely,  a  weak  legal  system  (strong 
corruption) could lead to badly governed firms and offer US acquirers more attractive investment 
opportunities. Accordingly, we do not offer any expectations on the sign of Law and order and 
Corruption. 
 
6.2 . Multivariate results 
Table 4 and 5 report respectively  descriptive statistics and results drawn from the multivariate 
analysis.  Our  findings  show  that  deal  characteristics,  namely  the  diversification  effect,  the 
method of payment, the change in control and glamour transactions do not significantly affect 
the  performance  of  acquirers.  This  conclusion  does  not  support  our  second  hypothesis  H2. 
Conversely, US acquirers with previous experience in Africa report higher performance (the 
coefficients is positive and significant at the 95%). Acquisitions of South African targets also 
lead to higher performance. This result could be driven either by i) the higher culture fit between 13 
 
South Africa and the US, or ii) the well-structured and dynamic business environment offered by 
South Africa. Board size has a negative and significant coefficient at the 90% level. This result is 
consistent with Yermack (1996) conclusion on the superior monitoring performed by smaller 
boards. In our case, large boards seem to be unable to prevent US acquirers from undertaking 
unsuccessful acquisitions in Africa.  
 
(Table 4, 5) 
 
Our control variables for the target legal environment and economic stability are both significant 
at  the  90%  and  99%,  respectively.  This  result  suggests  that  acquisitions  in  countries  with 
unstable economic environments lead to lower performance for acquirers, while those observed 
in countries with a strong legal system generate a higher performance. Our findings show that 
acquisitions are more successful when the target country offers a legal environment that protects 
investors’ rights which is consistent with Rossi and Volpin (2004). Surprisingly, the variable 
controlling for corruption does not affect the return reported by US acquirers contradicting the 
general  belief  that  corruption  might  help  foreign  companies  generate  higher  returns  by  use 
“unconventional” business practices.  
 
7.  Robustness checks 
 
In order to test the robustness of our results we run additional tests to control for the following 
arguments: 
 
Sustained  M&A  programs:  Frequent  acquirers  are  more  likely  to  create  value  through 
acquisitions because they have the necessary experience to successfully integrate the target’s 
activities into their existing businesses. Asquith et al. (1983) and Gregory (1997) report evidence 
showing a positive relation between stock price and the announcement of series of acquisitions 
while  Wimberley  and  Negash  (2004)  show  that  South  African  firms  engaging  in  multiple 
acquisitions generate larger negative returns. Hence, our results could be driven by subsequent 
acquisitions conducted by acquirers. We control for this argument by running two additional 
specifications:  one  including  a  dummy  variable  that  equals  one  if  the  acquirer  undertakes 
additional M&A transactions in Africa (FreqAfrica) during the year following the deal, and a 
second one including a dummy variable equals one if the acquirer undertakes additional M&A 
transactions anywhere in the world (FreqWorldwide) during the year following the deal. As long 
as acquisitions lead to learning effects, we expect these variables to have positive coefficients. 
Table 6 summarizes our results. Overall, the addition of these variables to the model does not 
affect our main findings. The dummy variables controlling for frequent acquisitions in Africa 
and Worldwide have non-significant coefficients which suggest that our results are not driven by 




Financial crisis effect: Univariate analysis reported in Table 2 suggested that the financial crisis 
might have a significant effect on the observed returns. In order to make sure that our results are 
not driven by the financial crisis, we performed a regression similar to the one reported in Table 
5  that  includes  a  dummy  variable  (Crisis)  indicating  whether  the  deal  took  place  after  the 14 
 
subprime crisis that started in July 2007. Our results are reported in the last column of Table 6. 
The financial crisis variable has a negative coefficient but it is not significant while our results 
remain stable.  
 
Industry and time effect: Inspection of our data shows that a large share of transactions included 
in our sample took place in the manufacturing and mining sectors. Thus, our results could be 
driven by industry effects. In order to address this issue, we rerun the same model than in Table 5 
while  including  dummies  to  control  for  industry.  Our  results  remain  unchanged,  with  the 
exception of the board size variable which loses its significance. We also rerun the same model 
than in Table 5 while adding year dummies to make sure that our results are not driven by time 
effect. Again, the variables South Africa, Experience, BOD size, Law and order and ERR have 
significant coefficients with identical signs to Table 5 while corruption remains non-significant.
7  
 
8.  Conclusion  
The objective of this  paper is  to  empirically examine the profitability  of US  acquisitions in 
Africa and the impact of firm level and country level governance characteristics on the long term 
performance of acquiring companies. Our results suggest that US acquirers do not benefit from 
their  African  acquisitions  and  report  negative  returns  following  the  acquisitions, 
underperforming  the  market.  Multivariate  analysis  suggests  that  deal  characteristics  namely 
diversification effect, change in control, method of payment and glamour deals do not affect the 
performance of US acquirers while acquisitions of South African targets seem to lead to higher 
returns. Our results also show the importance of the target institutional environment and cultural 
fit in shaping the success of a transaction. Acquisitions in countries with strong legal systems 
and/or low economic instability and those realized by acquirers with  previous experience in 
Africa lead to higher performance. Similarly, smaller boards at the acquirer level are associated 
with higher returns. Interestingly, the level of corruption does not seem to affect observed returns 
which contrasts with  the  general  belief that  corruption in  Africa allows  foreign investors  to 
extract higher returns. Our results are robust to control for time and industry effects, subsequent 
acquisitions, and the financial crisis effect. 
 
Overall, our findings highlight the need for African countries to implement reforms aimed at 
fostering  economic  stability  and  strong  foreign  investors’  protection.  Yet,  these  conclusions 
should be interpreted with a pint of salt given the small size of our sample. Future research 
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Completed M&A by US Non-Financial Acquirers in Africa: Top 5 Targeted Countries 
(1982- 2010)   
 
Target nation  Number of deals 
South Africa  131 
Egypt  28 
Gabon/ Zimbabwe/Angola  16 
Morocco/Tunisia  15 




Long Term Performance of US M&A in Africa -Univariate Analysis 
This table reports the one-year Buy and Hold returns (BHR 1yr) and the market adjusted one-year buy and hold 
returns (BHAR 1yr), for the entire sample as well as for subsamples of South African and non South African targets, 
transactions paid cash and those paid with other methods. P-values for the test of difference are obtained with a t-test 
(for mean equality) and a Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test (for median equality). *, **, *** refer to statistical significance 
at the 90%, 95% and 99% level, respectively. 
 
 
   BHR 1yr  BHAR 1yr 
Panel A- Acquirers' long run performance 
Mean  0.163  0.116 
Median  0.160  0.100 
N  96  96 
Panel B- Acquirers' long run performance by target origin 












for test of 
difference 
Mean  0.180  0.143  0.676  0.106  0.129  0.794 
Median  0.175  0.160  0.612  0.120  0.055  0.814 
N  52  44     52  44    
Panel C- Acquirers' long run performance by method of payment 














for test of 
difference 
Mean  0.166  -0.055  0.214  0.114  -0.055  0.218 
Median  0.157  -0.077   0.149  0.033  0.022  0.277 





Long Term Performance of US M&A in Africa –Calendar Time Approach 
This table summarizes results drawn from the calendar time approach based on a three factor model estimated using 
ordinary least squares. The dependent variable is Rpt which is equal to the return on a portfolio of acquiring firms during 
month t, Rft is the risk-free interest rate, (Rmt- Rft) is the excess return of the market, SMBt and HMLt are the difference 
in returns between a portfolio of small (high book-to market), and big (low book-to-market) stocks, respectively. The 
intercept (α) captures the monthly abnormal return for acquiring firms. *, **, *** refer to statistical significance at the 




βm  -0.002 
(0.460) 
βs  0.013 
(0.001)** 
βh  0.004 
(0.263) 
α  -0.381 
(0.000)*** 
R-Squared  0.0396 
N  284 




Descriptive Statistics  
This table summarizes descriptive statistics of the variables used in the multivariate analysis. (Focus) is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the target and the bidder have identical 4-digit SIC codes, zero otherwise, (BTM) is the 
book to market ratio, (Cash) is a dummy variable equals to 1 if the transaction is paid cash, (Control) is a dummy 
variable indicating whether the transaction leads to a change in control, (South Africa) is a dummy equals to one if 
the  target  home  country  is  South  Africa,  (Experience)  is  a  dummy  equals  to  one  if  the  acquirer  has  previous 
experience in Africa, (Block) is the  percentage of shares held by outside block holders, (BOD size) is the size of the 
board of directors, (IND board) is the share of independent directors sitting on the board, (Law and Order) measures 
the strength and impartiality of the legal system in the target country, (ERR) measures the economic stability in the 
country, and (Corruption) measures the level of corruption in the country.  
 
 
Variable  N  Mean  Median  Std. dev. 
Panel A- Deal Characteristics             
Focus  96  0.479  0.000  0.502 
BTM   95  0.685  0.277  1.236 
Cash   74  0.824  1.000  0.383 
Control  96  0.708  1.000  0.456 
South Africa  96  0.542  1.000  0.501 
Experience  91  0.802  1.000  0.401 
Panel B- Acquiers Governance Structure             
Block  93  0.060  0.000  0.162 
BOD Size  93  10.419  11.000  3.780 
IND board  93  0.728  0.8  0.228 
Panel C- Target Institutional Environment             
Law and Order   93  3.108  3.000  1.005 
ERR  93  36.860  38.000  4.717 
Corruption  93  3.01  3  1.246 




Determinants of the Post-Acquisition Performance of US M&A in Africa 
This table summarizes results drawn from multivariate analysis using ordinary least squares. The dependent variable 
is the 1-year BHR reported by the acquirer. Independent variables include (Focus) a dummy variable that equals one 
if the target and the bidder have identical 4-digit SIC codes, (BTM) the book to market ratio, (Cash) a dummy 
variable equals to 1 if the transaction is paid cash, (Control) a dummy variable indicating whether the transaction 
leads to a change in control, (South Africa) a dummy equals to one if the target home country is South Africa, 
(Experience) a dummy equals to one if the acquirer has previous experience in Africa, (Block) the  percentage of 
shares  held by outside block holders, (BOD size) the size of the board of directors, (IND board) the share of 
independent directors sitting on the board, (Law and Order) which measures the strength and impartiality of the 
legal system in the target country, (ERR) which measures the economic stability in the country, and (Corruption) a 
measure of the level of corruption in the country. *, **, *** refer to statistical significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% 
level,  respectively.  P-values  for  coefficients  are  reported  between  parentheses.  All  results  are  adjusted  for 
heteroschedasticity.  
     
Panel A- Deal Characteristics    
Constant  1.017 
   (0.072)* 
Focus  -0.003 
   (0.974) 
BTM   0.028 
   (0.193) 
Cash   0.115 
   (0.347) 
Control  -0.127 
   (0.256) 
South Africa  0.339 
   (0.09)* 
Experience   0.352 
   (0.019)** 
Panel B- Acquirer Governance Structure    
Block  -0.023 
   (0.934) 
BOD Size  -0.027 
   (0.079)* 
IND board  -0.144 
(0.423) 
Panel C- Target Institutional Environment    
Law and Order   0.115 
   (0.09)* 
ERR  -0.035 
   (0.006)*** 
Corruption  -0.017 
(0.787) 
N  66 
R-Squared  0.319 





This table summarizes results drawn from our robustness checks for frequent acquisitions and the effect of the 
financial crisis using ordinary least squares. The dependent variable is the 1-year BHR reported by the acquirer. 
Independent variables include (Focus) a dummy variable that equals one if the target and the bidder have identical 
4-digit SIC codes, zero otherwise, (BTM) the book to market ratio, (Cash) a dummy variable equals to 1 if the 
transaction is paid cash, (Control) a dummy variable indicating whether the transaction leads to a change in control, 
(South Africa) a dummy equals to one if the target home country is South Africa, (Experience) a dummy equals to 
one if the acquirer has previous experience in Africa, (FreqAfrica) a dummy equals one if the acquirer undertakes 
additional M&A in Africa during the year following the transaction, (FreqWorldwide) a dummy equals one if the 
acquirer undertakes additional M&A anywhere in the world during the year following the transaction, (Crisis) is a 
dummy equal one if the transaction took place after the financial crisis, (Block) the  percentage of shares held by 
outside block holders, (BOD size) the size of the board of directors, (IND board) the share of independent directors 
sitting on the board, (Law and Order) which measures the strength and impartiality of the legal system in the target 
country, (ERR) which measures the economic stability in the country, and (Corruption) a measure of the level of 
corruption in the country. *, **, *** refer to statistical significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level, respectively. P-
values for coefficients are reported between parentheses. All results are adjusted for heteroschedasticity. 
 
  Basic model  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Panel A-Deal Characteristics 
Constant  1.017 



































































     
-0.074 
(0.711) 
Panel B-Acquirer governance structure 
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Panel C: Target institutional environment 
























N  66  66  66  66 
R-Squared  0.319  0.337  0.346  0.321 
P-Value  0.007***  0.004***  0.008***  0.053* 
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Fig.1. Distribution of Completed M&A made by non-African Acquirers in Africa (1982-
2010) 
 
Source: Thomson One 





















































































Figure 2: Sector Distribution of Completed M&A made by US Non-Financial Institutions 
in Africa (1982- 2010)   
 
 
Source: Thomson One 
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Figure 3: Time Distribution of Completed M&A made by US Non-Financial Institutions in 
Africa (1982- 2010) 
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